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Introduction 
 
 
China’s Approach to  
International Climate Policy 
Change Begins at Home 
Susanne Dröge and Gudrun Wacker 
Chinese government officials have repeatedly declared that China – now the world’s 
biggest greenhouse gas emitter – wants to take on more responsibility for climate 
policy at the international level. Chinese emissions targets were announced in July at 
the Petersberg Climate Dialogue, but were then withdrawn. China, along with the 
United States, will play a decisive role in preparations for the Climate Summit of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris in 2015, 
during which a new agreement is to be launched. At home, China faces the challenge of 
reducing the tremendous harm done to its population by smog and environmental 
damage. Ad hoc measures may achieve quick successes, but without major structural 
changes the emissions trend will not change. This is challenging for Beijing, as can be 
seen in its wavering over international commitments. China’s international involve-
ment depends on: momentum from the U.S.; balancing the interests of developing 
countries; and the readiness of the EU to press forward on important issues bilaterally 
rather than internationally. 
 
The Chinese position in negotiations under 
the UNFCCC has gradually changed since 
2009. Targets for the reduction of green-
house gas emissions have become estab-
lished within China’s politics and have 
been included in its five-year plans. At the 
UN level, Chinese negotiators have repeat-
edly indicated that China will commit 
internationally to emissions targets after 
2020. China’s involvement with the inter-
national process began in 2009 when it 
submitted an emissions intensity reduction 
target of 40–45 percent by 2020 to the UN 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. 
Officially, China continues to define 
itself as a developing country under the 
UNFCCC. This claim is based on the Kyoto 
Protocol of 1997 (the only internationally 
binding climate treaty to date), according 
to which developing countries are not 
obliged to reduce emissions, whereas devel-
oped countries must make cuts by 2020. 
However, the U.S. withdrew from the proto-
col back in 2001 and has since demanded 
that newly industrialised countries commit 
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 to emissions cuts before it re-engages with 
the process. The conflict between the his-
torically largest polluter (the U.S.) and the 
future one (China) has blocked internation-
al negotiations for years. 
The National Level: Widespread 
Environmental Pollution 
However, the real drivers behind China’s 
policy change are national environmental 
problems, energy shortages, and the high 
economic costs associated with rapid devel-
opment. These challenges can only be over-
come if the Chinese government develops 
an overall plan balancing targeted growth 
with environmental protection. Beijing has 
been working towards this since its 11th 
five-year plan (2006–2010), and the 12th 
five-year plan (2011–2015) contains some 
specific milestones: energy intensity is to be 
reduced by 16 percent, and emissions by 
17 percent per unit of GDP; while the share 
of renewable energies in total energy con-
sumption is to rise from 8.3 percent in 2010 
to 11.4 percent. 
Above all, there is increasing pressure to 
take action over air pollution in China’s 
major economic centres. Smog has become 
a health risk, compromising the long-term 
productivity of the workforce and discour-
aging investors. Environmental issues now 
increasingly lead to protests by the Chinese 
people. In Beijing it has become standard 
practice to check air quality with special 
smartphone apps. During the March 2013 
National People’s Congress, 3000 delegates 
from across the country experienced the 
extent of the capital’s air pollution at first 
hand. In addition, more and more reports 
are published on the poor condition of 
China’s rivers and lakes, and agricultural 
land. 
Steps taken by China’s new leaders 
In autumn 2012, new personnel were 
appointed to key party positions, and in 
spring 2013 the highest government posts 
were re-allocated. Since then the Chinese 
leadership has placed a high priority on 
environmental protection, in their official 
speeches at least: the head of state and party 
leader, Xi Jinping, describes “ecological 
civilisation” (an idea already publicised at 
the 17th Party Congress in 2007) as an inte-
gral part of the “China Dream” (Zhongguo 
meng); and Prime Minister Li Keqiang has 
officially declared war on pollution. This 
strong language is mainly intended to re-
assure city-dwellers tormented by smog. 
By shutting down power stations and intro-
ducing driving bans the Chinese govern-
ment is trying to achieve quick results. 
According to official plans, economic 
growth in China will slow down over the 
coming years. The growth target for 2014 
is 7.5 percent, which should also mean that 
the growth in emissions will slow down. 
From 2005 to 2013 the Chinese economy 
grew by an average of 10 percent, and ener-
gy consumption by 6 percent annually. 
Over the same time period, energy intensity 
dropped by approximately 26 percent, stop-
ping the upwards trend of previous years. 
The road will get rockier 
The success of short-term measures – such 
as the reduction of coal consumption by 
7 percent compared with 2013 – should not 
belie the difficulty of maintaining such 
impressive emissions reductions. In 2013 
coal still accounted for 68.5 percent of 
primary energy use, and it accounts for 
most of China’s energy production. Since 
2005 the efficiency of large power stations 
has increased considerably, from 41.3 to 
75.6 percent. The reversal of the energy 
intensity of industrial production has also 
been achieved thanks to the “low-hanging 
fruit” of improved energy efficiency, and 
the closure of the worst industrial polluters. 
This is why analysts predict that current 
trends in lowering industrial emissions, 
energy savings and more efficient energy 
production will level out in the future. To 
combat greenhouse gas emissions effec-
tively, more far-reaching industrial reform 
is required. Moreover, it is important to 
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 include consumers in such policies, for 
instance by changing energy prices and 
introducing incentives for environmentally 
friendly consumption. 
For the time being, however, China’s 
growth will be characterised by continued 
industrialisation and urbanisation, and CO2 
emissions per capita will rise. In 2010, CO2 
emissions were 6.6 tonnes per capita (the 
global average being 4.8 t). Studies assume 
that China will not be able to reverse its 
emissions growth before 2030. The question 
of which year will see the peak in emissions 
is now hotly debated among Chinese ex-
perts, also with regard to international 
negotiations. New methods of coal combus-
tion are equally controversial. Chinese 
officials have announced plans to convert 
coal into gas in order to reduce smog. By 
building 50 facilities outside Beijing, they 
aim to meet future energy demand with 
“clean” gas. However, this would not reduce 
coal combustion but simply relocate it. 
Moreover, this energy conversion process 
would release vast additional quantities 
of emissions. 
Implementation and 
governance structures 
To support environmental policy Beijing 
has upgraded the environmental protection 
agency to a ministry. In addition, China 
amended environmental legislation at the 
National People’s Congress in April 2014. 
This first revision to the law in 25 years will 
come into force on 1 January 2015. How-
ever, it does not guarantee concrete imple-
mentation at the local level, especially in 
the absence of supervisory bodies, but also 
in view of the longstanding, unresolved 
conflict between the objectives of economic 
growth and urbanisation on the one hand, 
and sustainability and environmental pro-
tection on the other. The authority of local 
environmental protection agencies over 
large state-run companies has not been 
established, and incentives do not carry a 
clear enough message. Local actors simply 
do not recognise the advantages of increased 
climate protection – better air quality, less 
traffic, improved public health, higher en-
ergy security – despite the fact that these 
are in their own interest. 
The issue of energy prices in China is 
crucial. Since the energy companies are 
state-controlled, prices are not set by the 
market and reforms do not get off the 
ground. As a first foray in this direction, 
China is testing an emissions trading 
scheme in the form of seven pilot projects 
in specific provinces, mainly covering ener-
gy intensive and manufacturing industries. 
However, it is already clear that the intro-
duction of a nationwide emissions trading 
system, planned for 2015–16, will be de-
layed until approximately 2020. 
Cooperation with the U.S. and the EU 
As far as international climate negotiations 
are concerned, the U.S. and China declared 
their support for the UNFCCC negotiations 
process in early 2014. Since President Barack 
Obama recently put climate change back 
on the American political agenda, both 
states have been cooperating more closely 
(see SWP Comments 34/2014). In April 2013 
the U.S.-China Climate Change Working 
Group (CCWG) was set up to take action in 
the following five areas: reducing emissions 
from vehicles (especially heavy-duty vehi-
cles); implementing “smart grid” technolo-
gy; expanding carbon dioxide capture, 
utilisation and storage; improving energy 
efficiency in buildings and industrial 
plants; and collecting and managing data 
on greenhouse gas emissions. During the 
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
in July, the first issue the working group 
tackled was fuel and greenhouse gas emis-
sion standards. However, China’s chief 
climate official, Xie Zhenhua, stressed that 
his country would not agree to the same 
emission specifications as the U.S. at the 
UNFCCC Paris conference in 2015. At an 
informal meeting between President Obama 
and the new Chinese President Xi Jinping 
in June 2013, both agreed to cooperate on 
reducing chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Al-
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 though both presidents were expected to 
attend the world leaders’ Climate Summit, 
hosted by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon on 23 September in New York, Mr Xi 
Jinping has retracted this commitment. 
The EU, on the other hand, already ini-
tiated cooperation with China on energy 
and climate policy at the 8th EU-China 
Summit, back in 2005. At the 16th EU-
China Summit in November 2013 the two 
parties announced their intention to ad-
vance international climate negotiations in 
their EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation. As in China’s cooperation 
with the U.S., short-lived greenhouse gases 
and local air pollution are both on the 
agenda. There is also to be cooperation on 
structural issues (“green growth”, or sus-
tainable development) and specific regu-
lations. In recent years the EU has cooper-
ated closely on developing China’s pilot 
emissions trading schemes, and it will now 
help with capacity building in China. In 
2013 China joined the German-initiated 
Club der Energiewendestaaten (Club of Energy 
Transition States). 
However, several points on the 2020 
Strategic Agenda are linked to current con-
flicts between the EU and China. For in-
stance, the announcement of attempts to 
regulate the aviation industry stems from 
the dispute over the inclusion of Chinese 
airlines in the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme. A dispute over solar panels in late 
2013 (in which the EU limited imports of 
photovoltaic units from China with puni-
tive tariffs and quantitative restrictions) 
was resolved in part due to regular dialogue 
over trade policy. This dialogue is to be 
stepped up further. 
International Negotiations 
At the UN Climate Change Conference in 
Paris, China will present its own post-2020 
climate change target. However, its level 
of ambition will not be subject to outside 
influence, despite the various bilateral 
advances on climate policy. The key re-
quirement for China’s continued agree-
ment on climate policy issues is progress in 
tackling its domestic environmental prob-
lems. The extent of China’s financial con-
tribution to climate change development 
projects depends very much on its own 
interests, as does the integration of the 
Chinese emissions trading system into an 
international market. 
Yet for all its approaches to cooperation 
with the U.S. and the EU, China also has the 
unity of the G77 to consider. At the 2011 
UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, 
the EU managed to drive a wedge between 
more than 100 developing countries in the 
G77 and China. Nevertheless, China remains 
the predominant member of the group. 
Moreover, it is capable of building a strong 
coalition with India, Brazil and South 
Africa to resist pressure to make binding 
commitments. 
Therefore patience will be required to 
enter into a comprehensive international 
climate deal with China. Although China 
has embarked on its journey, the key mile-
stones will not be set on an international 
level, but rather in the context of its domes-
tic climate policy. 
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